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BILLs AND NOTES-DELIVERY OF INCOMPLET INSTRUMENT-EXTENT OF AUTHOR-
ITY TO CoMPLETE.The defendants endorsed an accommodation note made "to
the order of . . ." ,The person whose name the maker wrote into the blank
as payee refused to discount the note. To effect a discount to the plaintiff, the
maker therefore had the plaintiff add the words "or bearer." Held (two judges
dissenting), that the plaintiff could not recover from the accommodation
endorsers, as the insertion of "or bearer" was an unauthorized material altera-
tion which avoided the note as to them under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
First Natl. Bank v. Wood (1918, N. C.) 95 S. E. 14o.
Negotiable paper completed before delivery to the accommodated party for
purposes of negotiation falls under the general rule, and may not be altered.
Builders' Lime Co, v. Welmer (I915) i7o Ia. 444, 15I N. W. Ioo. But where
accommodation paper contains a blank for the name of the payee, the
accommodated party is "presumed" to have authority to fill that blank for
purposes of negotiation in any way consistent with the nature of a negotiable
instrument Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred (1870, U. S.) 9 Wall. 544; Bank
of Spartanburg v. Mahon (i9o6) 75 S. C. 255, 55 S. E. 529; see also I Daniel,
Neg. Inst. (6th ed.) sec. i42. The principal case turns on the court's interpre-
tation of the extent and purpose of such authority. It is clear that the accom-
modated party may fill in the name of a payee. N. I. L. sec. I4. He may also
turn the instrument into "bearer" paper by filling in the word "bearer," the
name of a fictitious payee, or in the absence of express prohibition, his own
name. See I R. C. L. io27; I Daniel, Neg. Inst. (6th ed.) see. 145. In both
instances the single aim is to procure negotiation. With such negotiation,
therefore, all authority to alter ceases. Builders' Lime Co. v. Welmer, supra.
And so, until the instrument by such negotiation becomes a note, the authority
should continue. Cf. Douglass v. Scott (837, Va.) 8 Leigh, 43 (change of date
before negotiation). To hold that the authority is "exhausted" by inserting the
name of a payee is to hold that failure of. negotiation to that one payee will,
contrary to the intention of all the parties, defeat the purpose for which the
transaction was entered upon. It seems hardly open to question that the dissent
in the principal case represents the sounder view.
CiARITABLE CORPORATIONS-LABILITY FOR TORTS-ELEvATOR AcCIDENT IN
BUILDING OPERATED FOR PROFIT.-The plaintiff's decedent was a tenant in an
office building owned by Vanderbilt University and used in part for the accommo-
dation of its law school but occupied chiefly by tenants to whom offices were
rented. To a declaration charging that the tenant's death was caused by the
negligence of an elevator operator employed by the defendant University a
demurrer was interposed on the ground that being an eleemosynary institution it
was immune from liability for the negligence of its agents. Held, that the
defendant was liable, with a dictum that a judgment for the plaintiff would be
collectible only from the income of the office building or other property of the.
defendant not used for educational purposes. Gamble v. Vanderbilt University
(I918, Tenn.) 200 S. W. 510.
The case contains an admirable review of the various theories upon which
different courts have rested the generally recognized exemption of charitable
corporations from liability for the torts of their agents. See also (1917) 26
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 791; 5 R. C. L. 374. Tennessee had previously adopted
the "trust fund theory," which bases the charity's immunity upon the ground
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that the payment of damages for torts would divert trust funds from the
purposes of the trust and would tend to discourage possible donors to charities,
to the detriment of the public welfare. Abston v. Waldon Academy (i9o6) 118
Tenn. 24, 102 S. W. 351 (the plaintiff being a student in the defendant academy).
A number of states explain the exemption on the theory that beneficiaries of the
charity assume the risk of negligent injuries. Powers v. Homeopathic Hospital
(igor, C. C. A. xst) 1O9 Fed. 294; cf. Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital (1918, C.
C. A. 3d) 247 Fed. 639. This theory, of course, permiis recovery when the
plaintiff, as in the principal case, does not belong to the class of persons who
enjoy the benefits of the charity. Bruce v. Central M. E. Church (19o7) 147
Mich. 230, iio N. W. 951; Hordern v. Salvation Army (igio) igg N. Y. 233, 92
N. E. 626; Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hospital (19x8, Neb.) 167 N. W. 2o8.
While rejecting these distinctions and adhering to their own doctrine founded
on public policy, the court asserts that "public policy is not a thing inflexible"
and that distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason may
dictate. Under the circumstances of the principal case, public policy is deemed
to demand the imposition of liability. A few authorities in accord are cited
in the opinion. Winnemore v. Philadelphia (19o2) 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 625;
Holder v. Mass. Horticultural Soc. (1912) 211 Mass. 370, 97 N. E. 630. It is
submitted that the result of the decision is sound and in accord with modern
tendencies to restrict the rule of general immunity of charities.
CoNFLIcT OF LAws-JURISDIcTIoN-DEGREE AFFECTING FOREIGN REALTY.-In
a suit brought before the United States District Court for the Southern Divi-
sion of the District of Idaho, against a Nevada corporation, the plaintiff charged
the defendant with using excessive quantities of water for irrigation in Nevada
from a river which also supplied the plaintiff further down stream in Idaho.
The federal court ordered, (I) that the defendant should not use more than a
stated quantity of water, (2) that it should place water meters on its Nevada
land to register the amount taken, and, (3) that the plaintiff should have the
privilege of going on that land for the purpose of inspecting the meters. The
defendant appealed on the ground, among others, that the court had no juris-
diction to enter such a decree respecting foreign land. Held, that the decree
below was correct. Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Salmon River
Land & Water Co. (1917, C. C. A. 9th) 245 Fed. 9.
See COMMENTS, p. 946.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ADMIRALTY-STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcTs
NOT APPLIcABLE TO INJURIES. WITHIN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTIOx-EFFECT OF
AMENDMENT BY CONGRESS.-By consent or without objection from the respond-
ents as to jurisdiction, the New York State Industrial Commission had made
awards to employees in cases within the jurisdiction of admiralty, prior to the
announcement of the decision in Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen (1917)
244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. lO86, Ann. Cas. 1917 E 9oo, discussed
in (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 255. Held, that, under that decision, such
awards were invalid, and that they might now be set aside, since want of juris-
diction of the subject matter could not be waived; also that admiralty jurisdic-
tion extended not only to repairmen working on a ship anchored in navigable
waters, but also to dockworkers employed under maritime contracts. Sullivan
v. Hudson Nay. Co. (ri8, App. Div.) 169 N. Y. Supp. 645.
A stevedore was injured while assisting in unloading a vessel. On the
authority of Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, supra, it had been held that
compensation could not be awarded under the Louisiana Compensation Act.
On rehearing it appeared that meanwhile (Oct 6, 1917) Congress had amended
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the act dealing with the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts, and
saving to suitors their common law remedies, by adding to it the words "and
to claimants the rights and remedies under the compensation law of any state."
40 U. S. St. at L. 385. Held, that admiralty had no jurisdiction, since the
stevedore was engaged in unloading, that Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen
was distinguishable as a proceeding in ren, and that in any event the amend-
ment applied and operated retroactively to permit the awarding of compensation.
l7easey v. Peters (1917, La.; rehearing, 1918) 77 So. 948.
See COMMENTS, p. 924.
CONTRACTS-IMPoSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE-EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT ORDER
SUSPENDING WORIC.-The defendant contracted to construct a system of reser-
voirs to be completed within six years. Eighteen months after the work was
begun the Minister of Munitions, acting under authority conferred by the
Defence of the Realm Act, ordered the defendant to cease work and requisi-
tioned his plant. The plaintiff sought a declaration by the court that this order
was covered by a section of the contract which empowered the plaintiff's
engineer to extend the time in case of any "difficulties, impediments, obstruc-
tions" or "oppositions" in the work, without affecting the obligation of the con-
tract. Held, that the contract was dissolved by the order. Metropolitan Water
Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co. (1917, H. of L.) 117 L. T. Rep. N. S. 766.
Following the rule stated in an oft repeated dictum in Paradine v. Jane (1647,
K. B.) Aleyn 26, subsequent impossibility has been held not to discharge the
promisor. School District v. Dauchy (1857) 25 Conn. 530. Bit an early excep-
tion to this rule was subsequent impossibility by action of the public authorities,
through legislation or otherwise. Baily v. De Crespigny (i86p) L. R. 4 Q. B.
i8o. The general rule was restricted further by readiness to imply a condition
of the continued existence of some person or thing, as in Taylor v. Caldwell
(1863, Q. B.) 3 B & S. 826; Dexter v. Norton (1871) 47 N. Y. 62. And with
the implication of a condition to excuse performance where impossibility super-
venes due to events that cannot be regarded as having been in the contempla-
tion of the parties, the "rule" is practically destroyed. See Baily v. De
Crespigny, supra, at p. 185; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hoyt (1893) 149 U. S. I,
14-15, 13 Sup. Ct. 779, 784; Tamplin S. S. Co. v. Anglo-Mexican, etc., Co. (H.
of L.) [1916] 2 A. C. 397, 403-404. The result seems to be that the promisor
is now held liable only when he expressly or by reasonable implication assumed
the risk of the particular contingency which gives rise to the impossibility; but
judges differ widely in their willingness to find such provision or implication.
Cf. the opinions in the case last cited. In the principal case, however, the
impossibility was only temporary. In such cases it has been held that the obliga-
tion is not discharged but at most is only suspended. Baylies v. Fettyplace
(1811) 7 Mass. 325; Tamplin S. S. Co. v. Anglo-Mexican, etc., Co., supra.
Here again, however, the modern tendency is to deal with each case on its own
facts. It had been held in earlier English cases that a delay arising from a
cause expressly excepted in the contract might be so long as to amount to a
"frustration of the adventure," so that to require performance of the obliga-
tion after such an interval would be, not the enforcement of the original con-
tract, but the substitution of a new one. Geipel v. Smith (1872, Q. B.) 26 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 361; Jackson v. Union Marine Ins. Co. (1874, Ex. Ch.) L. R. io C.
P. 125. The decision in the principal case applying the same doctrine to
enforced suspension by compulsion of law seems a reasonable one. The diffi-
culty of drawing the line, however, between those delays which are regarded as
mere temporary interruptions, and those involving a "frustration of the adven-
ture," is illustrated by a comparison of the principal case with the Tamplin S.
S. Co. case, supra.
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CONTRAcTS-OFFER AND AccE cE-MIsTAxE IN TRArsmrssIoN OF OFFER BY
TELEGRAm.-The National Bank of Powell, Wyo., telegraphed to the plaintiff an
offer to sell a car of potatoes at $1.35 per ioo. Through a mistake in the
transmission of the telegram it read when delivered: "Can furnish one car
clean potatoes at once $.35 per oo f. o. b. Powell." The plaintiff accepted the
offer dnd the Wyoming bank shipped the potatoes. Held, that the sender of the
telegram was bound by the message as delivered and that a contract was com-
pleted on the basis of $.35 per ioo. J. L. Price Brokerage Co. v. Chicago B. &
Q_ R. R. Co. (1917, Mo. K. C. App.) i99 S. W. 732. See CommENTs, p. 932.
CoNmTs-PERsoNAL SERVIcE-GRouNDS FOR DismissAL.-The plaintiff,
employed as superintendent of gas engine shops, absented himself for several
days from his work, for "diversion strictly personal," at a time when his pres-
ence was needed for the completion of delayed orders. He was dismissed
shortly after, and in the subsequent bankruptcy of his employer, filed a claim
for damages accruing from the alleged breach of his employment contract.
Held, that the claim could not be allowed because an employee's voluntary and
unnecessary absence from duty at a time when his presence was necessary to
the success of his employer's business was ground for discharge; and if such
ground in fact existed it was immaterial whether it was assigned, or even known
to the employer, at the time of the dismissal. Farmer v. First Trust Company
(1917, C. C. A. 7th) 246 Fed. 671.
Any act or neglect by an employee which injures, or tends to injure, his
employer's business, is ground for the employee's dismissal. Deane v. Cutler
(1892, Buff. Super. Ct) 20 N. Y. Supp. 617; Kidd v. American Pill & Medicine
Co. (1894) 91 Ia. 261, 59 N. W. 4i; Pearce v. Foster (1886, C. A.) IV Q. B. D.
536. This doctrine also applies to those serving in a supervisory capacity.
Armour & Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hart (893) 36 Neb. i66, 54 N. W. 262;
Norton v. McMurtry (i86o, Exch.) 2 L. T. Rep. N. S. 297. Yet the tendency
is not to hold this class of employees as strictly for their time as the clerk or
common laborer. Turner v. Kouwenhoven (1885) ioo N. Y. 115, 2 N. E. 637;
Shaver v. Ingham (1886) 58 Mich. 649, 26 N. W. 162. An employer is pro-
tected in dismissing an employee if a justification exists at the time, even though
he does not state it, or know of its existence; and though he assigns another
ground. Green v. Edgar (i88o, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 21 Hun 414; Sterling Emery
Wheel Co. v. Magee (i8go) 40 Ill. App. 340; Baillie v. Kell (x838, Eng. C. P.)
4 Bing. N. C. 638. Nor is the employer's motive of moment McKeithan v.
Telegraph Co. (1904) 136 N. C. 213, 48 S. E. 646; Jackson v. New York Medical
School (I893, N. Y. C. P.) 6 Misc. xox, 26 N. Y. Supp. 27; Boston Deep Sea
Fishing Co. v. Ansell (1888, C. A.) 39 Ch. Div. 339. Though practically all the
cases raising the point relate to personal service, this would seem to be merely
a sound application of the general doctrine of contracts, that a breach by one
party releases the other from further performance. Conversely, of course, the
discharge cannot be justified by acts or circumstances subsequently arising, for
in such a case the employer, by the discharge, has committed the first breach.
Gerardo v. Brush (i899) i2o Mich. 405, 79 N. W. 646. And a breach by the
employee, as a ground of discharge, may be waived by condonation. Spindel v.
Cooper (i9o5, N. Y. App. T.) 46 Misc. 569; 92 N. Y. Supp. 8=. Two early
Massachusetts cases indicate a contrary tendency, holding that a church or
parish may justify the dismissal of its pastor only on those grounds which were
alleged at the time of the dismissal. Thompson v. Catholic Society (1827,
Mass.) 5 Pick. 469; Whitmore v. Fourth Congregational Society (1854, Mass.)
2 Gray, 306. These seem to be the only cases in America relating to the dis-
charge of ministers; but they are so opposed to the current of authority as to
warrant the expectation that even in Massachusetts they would now be over-
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ruled or confined to their exact facts. Authority is lacking on the question of
whether the servant, in his turn, could set up as a defence for abandonment,
grounds not assigned when he left; but no reason appears why the doctrine
should not be equally applicable to such a case. See Woods, Master & Servant,
sec. 121; Thayer v. Wadsworth (1837, Mass.) ig Pick. 349.
CRiMiNAL LAW - CONSPIRAcY - INDucING RESISTANCE TO SELECrIVE DRAFT
Acr.The Act of Congress of June 15, 1917, known as the Espionage Act,
provides in section 3 for the punishmqnt of any person who, "when the United
States is at war, shall Willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, dis-
loyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United
States." The defendant was indicted under this provision for advising
registrants under the Selective Draft Act not to report .for duty when called.
Held, that the words "military forces" in the above provision of the Espionage
Act included those who had registered under the Selective Draft Act and had
received serial numbers, though not yet called by the local exemption boards for
examination, and that advising such persons not to report when called consti-
tuted a violation of section 3 of the Espionage Act. United States v. Sugarman
(Ir97, D. Minn.) 245 Fed. 604.
Section 37 of the federal Criminal Code (Comp. St. 1916, sec. io2oI) makes
it an offense to "conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United
States." Section 332 (Comp. St. 1916, sec. io5o6) provides that "whoever
directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law of the
United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its com-
mission, is a principal." Section 6 of the Selective Draft Act of May I8, 1917,
makes it a misdemeanor for any person to "evade . . . the requirements of
this Act" The defendants were indicted under these provisions for conspiring
to induce persons not to register under the Selective Draft Act whose duty it
was to do so. Held, that the conspiracy alleged was indictable under the sec-
tions above quoted. Goldman v. United States (918) 38 Sup. Ct. 166.
There seems to have been an oversight on the part of Congress in failing to
provide specifically in the Selective Draft Act for the offense of seeking to
persuade another to evade or disobey the provisions of the Act. The attempt
in the Sugarman case to bring this offense under the Espionage Act seems
hardly sustainable. One wonders if the same court would hold that a regis-
trant not yet called for examination who became intoxicated or committed a
breach of the peace could be tried by court martial. 'The view taken by the
court not only does violence to the natural meaning of words and to common
sense, but is contradicted, at least by implication, by the Selective Draft Act
itself, which distinguishes between registration and draft, and provides in
section 2 that "all persons drafted into the service of the United States . . .
shall, from the date of said draft . . . be subject to the laws and regulations
governing the Regular Army." The decision in United States v. Hall (1918,
D. Mont) 248 Fed. 150, contrary to the Sugarman case, that "military or
naval forces" in the Espionage Act means those organized and in service, is
therefore to be commended.
The procedure adopted in the Goldman case to reach a. similar offense rested
on a sounder basis. At first sight it might seem that a distinction was overlooked
between a conspiracy to do something and a conspiracy to induce another to do
it. Chief Justice Whites opinion does not help to clear up this difficulty, by
paraphrasing the statute and speaking of a conspiracy "to bring about an
illegal act." The real ground for sustaining the indictment was that, in the
light of section 332, above quoted, the conspiracy contemplated the actual com-
mission of a substantive offense against the United States by one or more
of the conspirators. Under that section, not only the person persuaded not to
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register, but also the person who persuaded him, would be guilty, as principal,
of a violation of the criminal provisions of the Selective Draft Act. The same
result had been reached on general principles of criminal law before section
332 was enacted. As applied to misdemeanors, that section is but declaratory of
the general doctrine of the common law. See United States v. Snyder (1882,
C. C. D. Minn.) 14 Fed. 554. And the resulting proposition that a conspiracy
to persuade another to commit a misdemeanor against the United States neces-
sarily involves a conspiracy to commit the same misdemeanor,--that is, to
become liable to indictment as a joint principal in the offense which the other
is persuaded to commit,-was clearly worked out by Judge Taft in Toledo,
etc., Railway Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (1893, C. C. N. D. Oh.) 54 Fed. 730,
735-737. While adequate for the Goldman case, this indirect method of
reaching the offense of seeking to induce others to resist the draft would
obviously fail when there was only a single offender and therefore no conspiracy;
and this was probably the reason why the prosecution in the Sugarman case fell
back on the Espionage Act. The dicta in United States v. Baker (1917, D. Md.)
247 Fed. 124, intimating that anything done with intent to .procure the commis-
sion of an offense is necessarily indictable, would seem clearly unsound. Cf. the
remarks about attempts in United States v. Hall, supra, at p. 153.
The omission to cover adequately this class of offenses has perhaps been
cured by the Sedition Act, recently passed by Congress. According to news-
paper reports, this Act provides for the punishment of any person who shall
"cause or attempt to cause or incite or attempt to incite insubordination, dis-
loyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty . . . or shall willfully utter, print, write or
publish any language intended to incite, provoke or encourage resistance to
the United States, or to promote the cause of its enemies." Part of this lan-
guage is the same as that of the Espionage Act, as quoted above in the state-
ment of the Sugarman case, but it will be noted that the limiting words, "in the
military or naval forces, of the United States," are omitted. Such general
language leaves much to construction, but the provisions quoted would seem
broad enough to cover inducing resistance to the draft, especially since, what-
ever may be their attitude in ordinary times, the courts in war time are
evidently not disposed to any niceties of construction in passing on offenses
which obstruct the war program.
EQUITY- INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATION - RECOVERY OF PROPERTY TRANS-
FERRED.-The defendant innocently made to the plaintiff misrepresentations of
fact which led to a mutual exchange of corporate bonds. Plaintiff brought the
present action to recover the bonds transferred to the defendant, offering to
restore those received from the latter. Held, that plaintiff was entitled in
equity to recover the bonds. Bloomquist v. Farson (1918, N. Y.) 118 N. E. 855.
See COmmENTS, p. 929.
GIFrTs-GIFT INTER VIVOS-DELivERY OF UNENDORSED CERTIFICATE OF STOcx.-A
mother handed her son, the defendant, a certificate of stock with words of gift,
but without filling out the usual form of assignment and power of attorney on
the back. In a subsequent will she bequeathed the stock to the plaintiff, who
brought suit to recover the legacy. Held, that the prior transaction did not
constitute a valid gift inter vivos, and that the plaintiff legatee was entitled to
recover. Heyer v. Sullivan (1917, N. J. Ch.) 1O2 Atl. 249.
The court in the principal case followed without comment a previous New
Jersey decision, Matthews v. Hoagland (i89i, V. C.) 48 N. J. Eq. 455, 21 Atl.
1054; and see in accord, Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Mali (I886) 65 Md. 93, 3 Atl.
286. But these decisions are opposed to the great weight of authority in this
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country. Marshall, Corporations, sec. 318; Bond v. Bean (19o4) 72 N. H. 444,
57 Atl. 340; Smith v. Meeker (1912) 153 Iowa, 655, 133 N. W. io58. The
majority rule fits with the general American rule that delivery of the evidence
of a chose in action, though without consideration, and without a written assign-
ment, will constitute a valid gift inter vivos of the chose in action, if the
delivery is made with that intent. Grover v. Grover (1837, Mass.) 24 Pick. 261
(negotiable note); Meriden Savings Bank v. McCormack (19o6) 79 Conn. 260,
64 Atl. 338 (bank book); Hani v. Germania Ins. Co. (igoo) 197 Pa. 276, 47 Atl.
200 (insurance policy). It has been said that the rule arose because our courts
did not recognize the distinction made by the English courts in regard to choses
in action between gifts causa mortis and gifts inter vivos. Oliver S. Rundell,
Gifts of Choses in Action (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 643, 654; and see
George P. Costigan, Gifts inter Vivos of Choses in Action (1911) 27 L. QuART.
REv. 326. But whatever the origin of the rule, it is now based on the doctrine
that since a chose in action is alienable at law as well as in equity, its transfer
should be assimilated to that of interests in tangible chattels; hence that
delivery of evidence of a chose in action-evidence received everywhere in
the business world as practically the chose in action itself in tangible form-
that such delivery made with intent to effect a gift of that chose, does constitute
a valid gift inter vivos. Walter W. Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action
(1916) 29 H.v. L. Rtv. 816; and see Editorial Note (1918) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 655, and cases there cited. And the fact is that the desirability of
making, shares of stock easily transferable has frequently caused the courts
to treat stock certificates in other respects as possessing attributes of tangible
property rather than as being merely evidence of choses in action. i Morawetz,
Corporations (2d ed.) sec. 226; Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. Mather (I895) 60
Minn. 362, 62 N. W. 396; Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co. (19oo) i65
N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 896.
INSURANcE-CHANGE OF BENFciARY-EFFECT or INSURED'S DEATH BEFORE
AcTioN BY INsuRER.-In an insurance policy the power and privilege of chang-
ing the beneficiary were reserved. Such change was to be made "by written
notice to the company at its home office, accompanied by the policy, and will take
effect only when endorsed on this policy by the company." The insured made
out a notice in writing, changing the beneficiary, and deposited it with his policy
in the hands of the local agent of the company. The insured died suddenly,
and thereafter the agent forwarded the papers to the home office and the
change was duly endorsed on the policy. Held, that these facts operated
to effect a change of beneficiary. State Mutual Life Ass. Co. v. Bessett (1918,
R. I.) lo2 Atl. 727.
The prevailing rule to-day is that the beneficiary has a vested right as soon as
the policy is executed. This right, however, may be created subject to a power
in the insured, or in the insured and insurer together, to change the beneficiary.
The question is as to just what facts will operate legally as an exercise of this
power,--a question to be answered by a fair construction of the terms of the
insurance contract, involving both state statutes and company by-laws. If no
special method of exercising the power is prescribed, any ordinary and reason-
able method, such as a written notice by the insured, is sufficient. Supreme
Conclave v. Cappella (189o, C. C. E. D. Mich.) 41 Fed. I. See also Ellis v.
Fidelity Co. (1913) 163 Iowa, 713, 144 N. W. 574 (changed by will). Where
the method is prescribed, it must be substantially complied with. But where
exact compliance with the prescribed method has been prevented by the bene-
ficiary, the change is usually held to be complete. Marsh v. Supreme Council
(1889) 149 Mass. 512, 21 N. E. Io7o; Hirschl v. Clark (i8go) 81 Iowa, 200, 47
N. W. 78. In many cases, the power is regarded as resting in the insured alone,
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and it has been very generally held that an attempted change of beneficiary was
effective when the insured had done "all that was required of him, or all
possible for him to do" even though the company's action on his request took
place after his death. Mutual Life Co. v. Lowther (1912) 22 Colo. App. 622,
126 Pac. 882; Wandell v. Mystic Toilers (i9o6) 130 Iowa, 639, io5 N. E. 448;
Grand Lodge v. McFadden (198o) 213 Mo. 269, I1 S. W. 1172; Luhrs v.
Luhrs (i8go) 123 N. Y. 367, 25 N. E. 388. According to these cases the
provision that the change is to "take effect only when endorsed on the policy
by the company," or when some similar act is done, does not give the insurer
the privilege of non-compliance with the insured's desire, but provides for a
purely ministerial act, the performance of which could either be compelled
by the new beneficiary or dispensed with altogether. There are some cases sub-
stantially in conflict with these, holding that where the insurer had not acted
on the insured's request the change was not effective and could not be enforced.
Freund v. Freund (19o5) 218 Ill. i89, 75 N. E. 925; O'Donnell v. Metropolitan
L. Ins. Co. (1915, Del.) 95 Atl. 289; Sheppdrd v. Crowley (1911) 6r Fla. 735,
55 So. 841. Even if an act of the insurer is one of the necessary operative acts
to effect the change, and even if this act is discretionary with the insurer (i. e.
he is privileged to do or not to do the act), there is no reason for requiring
that act to be done prior to the death of the insured. The power in the insurer
to effectuate the change comes from the original contract, to which the
beneficiary's right is at all times subject, and the later action of the insured
would seem to be merely a condition to the exercise of this power. Therefore
the death of the insured after having fully performed the condition should not
revoke the power of the insurer, even though the insured might possibly have
revoked it by a voluntary act while living. Luhrs v. Luhrs (i8go) 123 N. Y.
367, 25 N. E. 388 (semble). It necessarily follows, however, from the
recognition of a discretionary power in the insurer, that there is no change of
beneficiary if the company in its discretion refuses to do the necessary opera-
tive act, and this is true whether the insured is living or dead. Freund v.
Freund, supra. And the contract may, of course, expressly confine the power
of the insurer to acts performed prior to the death of insured. Modern Wood-
men v. Headle (1914) 88 Vt 37, go Atl. 893.
JuDGMENTs-EuITABLE RELIF-DEFENSE PREVENTED BY FAnuRE To REcEIVE
SUMMoNs.-A son forged his mother's signature to a note. In a suit upon the
note summons was served at the mother's former residence (where she no
longer resided) by delivery to the son, who concealed it from his mother. At
the trial he appeared and testified to the genuineness of his mother's signature,
and judgment was rendered against her. As the statutory period of 3o days for
setting aside a judgment had expired, the trial court denied relief. The mother
sued in equity for an injunction against enforcement of the judgment. Held,
that proceedings on the judgment should be perpetually stayed unless the defen-
dants should agree to a new trial. Yung v. Roll Stickley & Sons (1917, N. 3.
Eq.) io2 Atl. 698.
By rather labored reasoning the court construed this as a case of "accident,"
justifying equitable relief on that ground. No such straining of language would
seem to be necessary. The objection to the validity of the judgment was the
more fundamental one that the court had never acquired, by proper service,
any jurisdiction over the judgment defendant. But though the judgment was
void, there was no prodedure at law to set it aside after the thirty days, and the
aid of equity was therefore necessary to stop the machinery of enforcement.
It is well settled that where, in an action depending on personal service to give
jurisdiction, notice was not properly served upon the defendant, equity will
enjoin enforcement of a judgment. Jones v. Commercial Bank (184o, Miss.)
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5 How. 43 (defendant absent from residence) ; 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Remedies, sec.
663. This rule is of course subject to the usual qualification that equity will
act only when common law procedure affords no adequate remedy. Knight v.
Creswell (i9o7) 82 Ark. 330, IOI S. W. 754. Where the record at law is regular
on its face, there is a conflict of authority as to whether a meritorious defense
must be shown before an injunction will be granted. The majority rule seems
to require such a showing. Jeffery v. Fitch (1879) 46 Conn. 6oi; Bernhard v.
Idaho Bk. (1912) 21 Idaho 598, 123 Pac. 481; contra, Cooley v. Barker (19o4)
122 Iowa 44o, 8 N. W. 289. The persuasive argument of the minority is that the
complainant is deprived of his property without due process of law, and on this
ground an injunction should be granted independently of any other considera-
tion. 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Remedies, sec. 667. But it would seem that the hearing
before the court of equity would give him his day in court. In the principal
case there was no difficulty on this point, as the facts alleged showed a complete
defense to any liability on the note. Nor is it any bar to equitable relief in such
cases that the plaintiff at law was innocent of any wrongdoing or unfairness.
Jeffery v. Fitch, supra; 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Remedies, sec. 663.
JUDGMENTS - PERSONS CONCLUDED - RIGHTS OF ABSENTEE PRESUMED TO BE
DEAD.-The defendant was the depositary of an employees' savings fund. The
particular deposit in question was payable upon the death of the depositor to
his sons or, if they were not living, to his legal representatives. His executrix
demanded payment, the sons having been absent and unheard of for 18 years.
From a judgment for the plaintiff the defendant appealed on the ground that
such judgment would not protect it from having to pay again to the sons, should
they subsequently appear. Held, that the judgment for the plaintiff was correct,
with a dictum that payment thereunder would protect the defendant. Maley v.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (1917, Pa.) 1OI Atl. 9ii.
See COMMENTS, p. 943.
NEGLIGENCE-AcTING IN EmERGENC.-The defendant company in constructing
a dam pumped water into a chute whence it was discharged into the river caus-
ing a swift current The deceased, an employee of the defendant and an
expert swimmer, fell into the chute, was carried into the river and was drowned.
In a suit for wrongfully causing his death, the negligence complained of was
that a fellow employee attempted to give aid to the deceased instead of immedi-
ately stopping the pumps and thus abating the current. Held, that a verdict for
the defendant was properly directed. Kelch's Adm'r v. National Contract Co.
(918, Ky.) 199 S. W. 796.
Negligence is a relative term dependent upon the circumstances under which
one acts or fails to act. In an emergency, one who acts according to his best
judgment, even though the event proves that he failed to choose the most
judicious course, is not chargeable with negligence. Such act or omission may
be called a mistake but not carelessness. Brownw v. French (1883) 1O4 Pa. 604;
Floyd v. Philadelphia R. R. Co. (1894) 162 Pa. 29, 29 Atl. 396. The question
usually arises in cases where the defendant seeks to escape liability on the
ground that the injured plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in choos-
ing the wrong way to protect himself from the impending danger. See Geary
v. McCreary (1912) 147 Ky. 254, 143 S. W. 1OO4. Dicta in certain Iowa cases
seem to indicate a tendency to confine the emergency rule to such situations.
See Boice v. Des Moines City Ry. Co. (1911) 153 Iowa 472, 477; 133 N. W.
657, 659. But other courts have applied the rule to defendants acting with
mistaken judgment in an emergency which they have not caused. Sekerak v.
Jutte (1893) X53 Pa. 117, 25 Atl. 994. It is submitted there is no sound basis
for limiting the rule to the defence of contributory negligence. The effect of
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an emergency in depriving a person of time for' calculated consideration is the
same whether he be the one in danger or the one whose duty it is to avoid
the threatened injury. The principal case correctly holds that the law of
negligence does not and should not require mathematical accuracy or conduct
of exact calculation in emergencies whatever the- relation of the person to the
event. See Wise Ter. Co. v. McCormick (19o5) 1O4 Va. 40o, 414, 51 S. E.
731, 736.
NEGLIGENCE-AssuMPTION OF RIsK -VOLUNTEER REMOVING ELECTRIC WIRE
FROM PUBLIC STRmE.-A broken telephone wire of the defendant company
became charged with electricity by contact with a wire of the city lighting
system. The plaintiff's decedent, a volunteer, received a fatal shock while
attempting to remove the broken wire from the street in order to avert possible
injury to passers-by. His administratrix sued the defendant for negligently
causing his death. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. Held, that the
judgment was correct. Hamer, J., dissenting. Workman v. Lincoln Tel. & Tel.
Co. (1918, Neb.) 166 N. W. 550.
The defendant's negligence being established by the verdict of the jury, the
decision turns upon the effect of the plaintiff's assumption of risk. In actions of
this type assumption of risk will bar recovery unless sufficient justification is
found for the plaintiff's assuming it Protection of one's own property is held
to be such a justification; as where one was injured in attempting to remove a
sputtering wire which endangered his property. Leavenworth Coal Co. v. Ratch-
ford (1897) 5 Kan. App. i5o, 48 Pac. 927. But this principle does not apply
where it was not the wire which brought danger to the property, but the location
of the property, or the owner's desire to make a given use of it, which brought
the plaintiff into danger. State v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. (1914)
123 Md. i2o, 91 Atl. 149 (climbing telegraph pole to rescue a pet cat) ; Hickok
v. Auburn Light, etc., Co. (1911) 2oo N. Y. 464, 93 N. E. 1113 (climbing pole
to put new bulb into a light). Under certain conditions the plaintiff can also
find justification in his intention to prevent injury to persons. So with a fore-
man, not employed by the defendant, killed while attempting by removal of the
defendant's dangling live wire to prevent possible injury to his fellow-workers.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Moore (191o, C. C. A. Ist) 179 Fed. 364. So
also with a policeman, whose duty it is to protect the public. Bourget v. Cam-
bridge (1892) 156 Mass. 391, 31 N. E. 390; Dillon v. Allegheny, etc., Co. (1897)
179 Pa. 482, 36 At. 164. The principal case is novel in that it seems to be the
first in which recovery was allowed in the given situation for injuries sustained
by an ordinary member of the public, acting only from public spirit. With this
principle the dissenting opinion may perhaps be reconciled, and the dissent
rested on the ground that the decedent was not reasonably prudent in his
choice of means. Of course recovery is properly barred where the risk is
taken in acts which have no reasonable relation to the protection of property
or persons, such as touching wires to show that they are harmless. Carroll v.
Grande Ronde Electric Co. (i9o6) 47 Ore. 424, 84 Pac. 389; Anderson v. Jersey
City Electric Co. (I9OO, Ct Err.) 64 N. J. L. 664, 46 At. 593. And it may be
suggested that the evil sought to be avoided might be required to bear some
proportion to the apparent risk. For a further note on the liability of tort
feasors to volunteers, see 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 415.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES-RESIDENCE OF PARTIES-PLAINTIFF A RESIDENT OF STATE
BUT NOT OF DISTRIcT IN wHICH SUIT IS BROUGHT.-Two citizens of Alabama, one
residing in the Middle District and the other in the Southern District, sued a
Louisiana corporation in a state court in the Southern District of Alabama.
Held, that the defendant might remove the cause to the federal district court
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for the district within which the suit was pending. M. Hohenberg & Co. v.
Mobile Liners. Inc. (1917, S. D. Ala.) 245 Fed. i69.
See COMMENTS, p. 935.
SALEs-BILs OF LADiNG-RESEEVATION OF TiTE.--The National Bank of
Powell, Wyo., telegraphed to the plaintiff an offer to sell a car of potatoes at
$1.35 per ioo. Through a mistake in the transmission of the telegram it read
when delivered: "Can furnish one car clean potatoes at once $.35 per 100
f. o. b. Powell." The plaintiff accepted the offer and the Wyoming bank shipped
the potatoes, sending a bill of lading to a bank at St Joseph, Mo., with draft
attached for the amount of the sale at $1.35 per ioo. The plaintiff tendered
the amount due on a 35¢ basis both to the St Joseph bank and to the carrier.
Being unable to obtain possession of the shipment the plaintiff brought replevin
against the railroad company. Held, that upon tender of the price according to
the contract, the title and right to possession passed to the plaintiff, and that
the action could be maintained. J. L. Price Brokerage Co. v. Chicago B. & Q.
R. R. Co. (1917, Mo. K. C. App.) 199 S. W. 732. See COMMENTS, p. 932.
SALEs-WAPRANTIES-IPLIEm WARRANTY OF WHOLESOMENESS OF FooD.-The
plaintiff purchased and ate at the defendant's drug store ice cream manufactured
by the defendant In an action for damages for illness caused by the presence
iii the cream of tyrotoxican, a filth product, the trial court charged that the
defendant impliedly warranted the cream wholesome and fit to eat Held, that
the instruction was correct Race v. Krum (1918, N. Y.) I18 N. E. 853.
See COMMENTS, next month.
TORTS-ENTICING AWAY PLAINTIFF'S EmPLoYEE-JUSTIFICATIoN The defen-
dant corporation induced an employee of the plaintiff corporation to leave the
plaintiff in order to enter the service of the defendant Under his contract with
the plaintiff the employee in question was under no duty to remain. The plain-
tiff sought an injunction. Held, that the defendant had committed no legal
wrong and that an injunction should be denied. Triangle Film Corporation v.
Artcraft Pictures Corporation (igi8, C. C. A. 2d) 59 N. Y. L. J. 283.
In spite of the dictum of Pitney, J., to the contrary in Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell (1917) 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (commented on in [1918] 27 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 794-795), the decision in the principal case seems both sensible and
sound. As Learned Hand, J., says in the course of his brief but illuminating
discussion, "the result of the contrary would be intolerable both to such
employers as could use the employee more effectively and to such employees as
might receive added pay. It would put an end to any kind of competition." The
learned court felt the contention of the plaintiff to be "so extraordinary" that
it refused "to consider it at large" and apparently deemed it unnecessary to
cite authorities. Actual decisions upon the point are in fact not numerous.
See (igi8) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 794. The opinion of the court in the
principal case is to be commended for its frank recognition that the decision
really involved a determination of policy, viz., what shall be recognized as "just
cause" for intentionally interfering with the "status" of employer and employee
which existed between the plaintiff and the person induced to leave.
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-LIABILITY OF CONTRACTOR TO THmD PARTY.-The defen-
dant corporation constructed a highway bridge under contract with county com-
missioners. Some years after the bridge had been accepted by the county, the
appellants decedent sustained fatal injuries from its collapse due, as the plaintiff
alleged, to negligence in its construction. Held, that the complaint stated a good
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cause of action. Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co. (1918, Ind. App.) 118 N. E.
694.
This case calls attention to the gradual passing of the old rule that a con-
tractor is not liable to indeterminate third parties for injuries caused by defec-
tive construction because there is no privity of contract between them. See
Winterbottom v. Wright (1842, Exch.) io M. & W. iog. The first departure
from the old rule was made in the case of articles inherently dangerous to life
or health. Thomas v. Winchester (1852) 6 N. Y. 397 (poison wrongly labelled).
The character of the article imposed upon the maker a positive duty of care-
a tort duty-not to deal with it so as to cause harm to any person who might
reasonably be expected to use it; the lack of privity of contract could be no
defense to a violation of this duty. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deseims (19o8)
212 U. S. 159, 29 Sup. Ct. 27o. Some courts extend the duty of care to include
cases where the instrumentality was not dangerous in itself but was made so by
defective construction. Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co. (1903, C. C. A.
8th) i2o Fed. 865; MacPherson v. Buick Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E.
iO5O; see also (x916) 25 YALE LAWv jouRNAL, 679. But many courts have
refused to go so far. Some hark back to the old and pointless objection of
lack of privity, as though the sole liability were in contract for breach of implied
warranty, and not equally in tort. See Cadillac Co. v. Johnson (1915, C. C. A.
2d) 221 Fed. 8oi. Other courts have argued that the doctrine would create a
liability so indefinite as to expose industry to ruin through litigation. Curtin v.
Somerset (i89i) i4o Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244. Indefiniteness, if an objection, would
apply to any tort duty; the conclusion' drawn from it seems to represent a
mistaken view of fact and policy-it presupposes a prevalence of negligence
which, if it exists, can best be remedied by making such negligence expensive.
On the relation of the doctrine here discussed with that of liability for breach
of warranty by a vendor, see p. 96I, supra. As in the principal case, bridge
contractors have been held liable for injuries caused to the traveling public by
negligent construction, but the cases have always, so far as discovered, laid
emphasis upon the fact that the defects in construction were known to the
defendant and were concealed from the other contracting party as well as from
the public. O'Brien v. American Bridge Co. (191o) iiO Minn. 364, 125 N. W.
1012. Whether there would be liability if the contractor had faithfully per-
formed his contract and the injury were due merely to a defect in the plans
which the contractor ought to have recognized as creating a structure dangerous
to the public is a question which the principal case suggests but does not decide.
Nor does it at all discuss the question of the defendant's knowledge of the
defect: the case came up on demurrer to a complaint in which actual knowledge
was alleged. Such actual knowledge is held in one group of cases essential to
the defendant's liability. Schubert v. Clark (1892) 49 Minn. 331, 51 N. W.
11o3; Earl v. Lubbock [19o5] i K. B. 253. A second group holds "imputed"
knowledge to be sufficient, but only when the circumstances are such as to war-
rant a jury in finding that the defendant must have known of the defect.
O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., supra. Courts which follow this theory deny
the defendant's liability where he only "should have known" or "ought to have
known." Wood v. Sloan (I915) :2o N. M. 127, 148 P. 507. A third group holds
that if the defendant should have known, he cannot escape because he did not
know. MacPherson v. Buick Co., supra. The last rule, applying a purely objec-
tive test, seems to be more in accord with the general principles of tort liability.
TpA_.E-MAlUcs-APLIcATIoN To DiFFERENT GooDs OF SAemE CLAss.-The plain-
tiff was the registered owner of the trade-mark "Old Crow" which it had
always applied to its straight rye and bourbon whiskey. It sought an injunction
against the defendant's use of the same trade-mark on the defendant's straight
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whiskeys. The defendant pleaded a prior adjudication to the effect that the
defendant had first appropriated the trade-mark "Old Crow" to designate its
blended whiskey, although by laches it had lost its exclusive rights in this name
as against the plaintiff. Held, that by virtue of prior appropriation of the
trade-mark for blended whiskey the defendant was privileged to use it also for
straight whiskey. Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. Gaines & Co. (1918, U. S.)
38 Sup. Ct 327.
The gist of the wrong of unfair competition in trade-mark cases is the
probability that the public may be led to mistake the defendant's goods for those
of the plaintiff. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Garner (1876, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 54 How.
Prac. 297. The test applied by the courts to determine such probability is free
of fine distinctions; it is the care exercised by the average buyer of that partic-
ular class of goods. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. Feigenspan (z899, C. C. D. N.
J.) 96 Fed. 206. Rushmore v. Badger Brass Mfg. Co. (1912, C. C. A. 2d) 198
Fed. 379. It follows that the right to the exclusive use of a given trade-mark
may be restricted to its use on a particular class of goods, and the use of the
same mark by another permitted in connection with a different class. Virginia
Baking Co. v. Southern Biscuit Works (igio) ii Va. 227, 68 S. E. 261 (soda
crackers and ginger snaps; the propriety of putting them in separate classes
may, however, be doubted). But within its own class the trade-mark will be
protected by injunction. As the court says, great confusion would arise in
business from recognizing the same trade-mark as belonging to different persons
for different kinds of the same article. Authorities in the lower courts accord:
American Tobacco Co. v. Polacsek (19o9, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 17o Fed. 117
(smoking tobacco and cigarettes); Collins Co. v. Oliver Ames Corp. (1882, C.
C. S. D. N. Y.) 8 Fed. 561; (axes, etc., and spades) G. G. White Co. v. Miller
(1892, C. C. D. Mass.) 5o Fed. 277 (straight and blended whiskey); Layton
Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co. (191o, C. C. A. 8th) 182 Fed. 35
(baking powder and baking soda). See also (1911) 3o L. R. A. (N. S.) 167. It
is, however, possible as in the principal case that a prior appropriator may by
laches lose his exclusive right against all competitors and as far as the other
party to the suit is concerned, have merely a privilege or as the case calls it, a
"defensive right" to use the mark. The cases on the main point of the instant
case, though not numerous, are in agreement.
TRADING WITrr THE ENEmY-CoNTRAcTS CONFERRING PECUNIARY .ADVANTAGE ON
Cr:TIzEN-In August, 1915, the defendants, D & Co., a French firm, sold to the
plaintiff, Y, a subject of Bulgaria resident in Marseilles, a quantity of wheat to
arrive. By the French law of September 27, 1914, the performance of any con-
tract between a German or Austrian and a Frenchman, operating to the advan-
tage of the German or Austrian, was declared null and void, which provision
of law was extended to subjects of Bulgaria by decree of November 7, 1915.
When the wheat arrived this decree was in force, on which ground the defen-
dants refused to make delivery to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had in the mean-
time resold much of the wheat to French individuals at a loss. Examination of
the terms of the contract and of the interests of the various parties under it
showed that it operated to the decided advantage of Frenchmen and to the dis-
advantage of the. plaintiff. Held, that the defendants should be ordered
to make delivery to the plaintiff. Yudzari v. Dreyfus, Tribunal de Commerce of
Marseilles, Nov. 16, 1915, reported in (1917) 44 CLuNEr, 1015.
The case illustrates two striking differences between the French and the
Anglo-American law. (i) The plaintiff, although resident in France, was
regarded as an alien enemy, the test of nationality determining enemy character
for trading purposes. The Anglo-American test of domicil would have relieved
the plaintiff from this status. His permission to sue in France is attributable
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to the special privilege in this respect extended to Bulgarians for political
reasons. (2) Under the French law, not all contracts between alien enemies
appear to be void and non-executable, but only such as are of pecuniary profit
to the enemy. This requires the court to examine the benefits to be derived
from the operation of such a contract. Although in this case the court found
that the plaintiff would sustain a loss and Frenchmen derive a profit from the
enforcement of this contract, it is not explained why the plaintiff sued at all.
Quaere, whether the court would examine comparative advantages, and follow
the test of preponderating advantage. Under Anglo-American law, the con-
tract would be absolutely void, if made between alien enemies in the Anglo-
American sense, regardless of the question of benefits. The consideration of
"benefit to the subject" is applied in another connection, namely, in aid of the
rule that alien enemies are not relieved from suit in the courts at the hands of
subject plaintiffs. Porter v. Freudenberg (C. A.) [1915] 1 K. B. 857. Cf.
also Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co. (H. of L.) I918] A. C. 26o.
TRUSTS-CONSTRUcTIVE TRUST-MURDER OF TENANT BY ENTIRETY BY CO-TENANT
WITHOUT INTENTION TO PROFIT BY HIS CRIME.-A husband and wife held real
estate as tenants by the entirety. The husband murdered his wife and then com-
mitted suicide. It was shown that he committed the crime without any intention
of acquiring title as surviving tenant by the entirety. The executor and heirs of
the wife filed a bill in equity to quiet their title against the administrator and
heirs of the husband. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief prayed
for. Van; Alstyne v. Tufty (i918, N. Y. Trial T.) 9 Rochester-Syracuse Daily
Record, 44.
When a prospective heir murders his ancestor, or when a devisee or legatee
murders his testator, a problem arises upon which the courts have taken diver-
gent views. By legislation the murderer may, as part of the penalty for his
crime, be deprived of the privilege of inheritance. Estate of Donnelly (I899)
125 Cal. 417, 58 Pac. 61. In the absence of legislation three views are possible.
(I) The murderer may be given title on the ground that the courts are power-
less to read into the statute of descent or into the will an exception excluding
him. Although the result shocks one's sense of justice, this view is supported
by the weight of authority. Wall v. Pfanschmlidt (1914) 265 Ill. i8o, io6 N. E
785. (2) The opposite view, sustained by a few courts, excludes the murderer
from taking title, on the ground that the statute of descent or the will must be
read in the light of public policy, which forbids a person to profit by his own
crime. Perry v. Strawbridge (1908) 209 Mo. 621, io8 S. W. 641. (3) The
third view, based on principles of constructive trusts, prevails in New York
and a few other jurisdictions. Legal title is recognized as passing to the
murderer, but on equitable principles a trust is raised in favor of the heirs of the
person murdered. Ellerson v. Westcott (1896) 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540,
explaining Riggs v. Palmer (I889) 115 N. Y. 5o6, 22 N. E. i88; Cleaver v.
Mutual Reserve, etc., Assn. (C. A.) [1892] 1 Q. B. 147. This view, it is sub-
mitted, accomplishes justice without judicial legislation and in accordance with
recognized principles. It also enables a bona fide purchaser from the murderer
to be protected in his title. The principal case is a logical extension of the New
York rule. It is worthy of note in that it applies the constructive trust principle,
to the innocent heirs of the wrongdoer, and this regardless of the motives of the-
murderer in committing the crime. On the latter point cf. Hall v. Knight (C.
A.) [1914] P. I (a recent English case excluding from succession under a will
a devisee convicted of manslaughter in killing the testator). Only one other case
dealing with estates by entireties in this connection seems to have been decided.
Beddingfield v. Estill (1907) 118 Tenn. 39, 1oo S. W. io8. There an opposite
result was reached on the ground that in an estate by the entirety the surviving
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spouse does not take by inheritance but as survivor by virtue of the original
grant. But this is no adequate reason for refusing to apply the equitable prin-
ciples above discussed. See (1897) 36 Am. L. REG. (N. S.) 225, 237.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-OBsTRUCTING NATURAL STREAm-ExTRAORDiNARY
RAIN As Ac? OF GOD.-The defendant enclosed in culverts a stream flowing.
through its land. As the result of an unprecedented storm the culverts proved
insufficient, and overflowing water damaged the plaintiff's property. In its
natural condition the channel would have been sufficient to carry off the flood.
Held, that the defendant was liable, some of the opinions resting on the ground
that an extraordinary rainfall in Scotland was not to be deemed an act of God,
and one at least on the ground that one who substitutes an artificial watercourse
for a natural one is absolutely responsible for damage caused by any flood which
would have passed safely through the natural channel. Corporation of Greenock
v. Caledonian Railway Co. (1917, H. of L.) 117 L. T. Rep. N. S. 483.
Persons who obstruct the natural flow of a stream will in general be liable
for damage by overflow caused by the obstruction. McCoy v. Danley (1852)
2o Pa. 85, 57 Am. Dec. 68o. But it is commonly said that for damage due to
such an unwonted flood as may be deemed an act of God, the defendant will be
absolved from liability. Dorman v. Ames (1867) 12 Minn. 451. When a flood
may be so deemed is a question to which it is difficult to find a definite answer
in the decisions. Of course one who artificially changes a watercourse must
build to accommodate all the water which can be anticipated under the circum-
stances, having in view the climate, topography, etc. Sabine v. Johnson (1874)
35 Wis. 185. Thus when the stream had previously several times overflowed
its banks, it was held not enough to accommodate only the water that would
flow within the natural bed and banks. Dunn v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (1917,
Ind. App.) 114 N. E. 888. While each decision in this field must necessarily
depend on its own peculiar facts, it would seem that the principal case illustrates
a tendency of the courts of Great Britain to be rather less willing than are
American courts to find an act of God in given circumstances. Cf. Kerr v. Earl
of Orkney (1857, Scot Ct Sess.) 2o Dunlop, 298; Dorman v. Ames, supra;
Helbling v. Allegheny C emetry Co. (19o2) 2Ol Pa. 171, 5o Atl. 97o. Indeed,
Lord Wrenbury's opinion indicates that, in his view at least, no storm, however
extraordinary and unforeseeable, would excuse the defendant if the natural
channel would have been sufficient to carry off the flood. The case is also inter-
esting for the comments of the Lords Justices upon Nichols v. Marsland (1876,
C. A.) 2 Ex. Div. i, in which the act of God exception to the Rylands v. Fletcher
doctrine was established.
WORKmEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-IN JURY ARISING "OUT OF" THE EMPLOYX-
MENT-AssAULT BY FEL.ow-EmPLowE.-The claimant's intestate, an employee
of the defendant company, died as a result of injuries received in a fight follow-
ing an assault upon him by a fellow-employee, arising out of a controversy
over the possession of a ladle. It was the policy of the defendant company in
making iron castings to furnish their employees with only a limited number of
ladles so as to avoid too much crowding of the casters around the cupola where
the molten metal was drawn out, and so as to prevent them from finishing their
day's work too early. Held, that the injury did not arise "out of" the employ-
ment. Jacquemin v. Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. (1918, Conn.) 103 Atl. 115.
An injury resulting directly from a wilfully tortious or sportive 'act of a
fellow-employee who departs temporarily from the scope of his employment to
conduct himself in this manner is not generally held to be within that class of
injuries for which the legislatures have provided compensation. (917) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 142; Kiser, Workmen's Compensation Acts, 79; Federal
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Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic (igi6) 162 Wis. 34i, I56 N. W. 143; Pierce v.
Boyer, etc. Coal Co. (1916) 99 Neb. 321, 156 N. W. 509. An injury resulting
indirectly from such an act is within the compensable class. Knopp v. American
Car & Foundry Co. (1914) 186 Ill. App. 6o5. However, the general rule has
been narrowed by exceptions. Where the nature of the employment peculiarly
exposes the employee to the risk of such injuries, an injured employee is entitled
to compensation. Polar Ice & Fuel Co. v. Mulray (igi8, Ind. App.) ii9 N. E.
149 (shooting of a servant employed to check and collect for shortages of other
servants); State v. District Court (ig16) 134 Minn. I6, I58 N. W. 713. And
when the fellow-employee is in the habit of conducting himself in a manner
dangerous to his fellows, it is held that the injury arises "out of" the employ-
ment, as resulting from a risk incidental to the conditions under which the
employee must work. In Re Loper (1917, Ind. App.) I16 N. E. 324; McNicol's
Case (1913) 215 Mass. 497, 1O2 N. E. 697. But, for recovery in such a case, it
must appear that the employer had knowledge of the danger. Schnoll v.
Weisbrod & Hess Brewing Co. (igi6, Sup. Ct.) 89 N. J. L. i5o, 97 Atl. 723;
Stuart v. Kansas City (ig8, Kan.) 171 Pac. 913. Under this subjective test it
would seem that, as with the dog-bite scienter, the first injury caused by a given
employee to another is not compensable, even though the second one might be.
But see M'Intyre v. Rodger & Co. (i9o3, Ct. Sess.) 41 Scot L. Rep. io7;
Heita v. Ruppert (igi6) 218 N. Y. 148, 112 N. E. 75o. There seems to be no
reason to doubt either the holding in the principal case, or its suggestion that
notice of a tendency in the conditions or the men to cause trouble would be
enough to charge the employer although no actual injury had previously
resulted.
